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Multiple crises shook the European Union (EU) during the past decade. First, the 
economic and financial crises that unfolded since 2008 shook the foundations of the 
European project and its monetary union. Then, the inflow of migrants and asylum 
seekers into Europe in 2015 questioned the EU’s ability to jointly respond to 
common political issues. More recently, Brexit came across as the corollary of a 
prolonged legitimacy crisis. These crises are have not only affected the course of 
European integration, but also provided novel issues for political competition 
within the EU member states. At the party-political level, populist anti-
establishment parties have traditionally listed among the principal interpreters and 
drivers of criticism towards ‘Europe’. In this article, we empirically address the 
changing Eurosceptic frames adopted by populist parties during these crises, and 
speculate on the reverberation of these frames in respective party systems. For this 
purpose, we focus on two cases: Italy and the Netherlands. Both countries present 
instances of populist parties of different ideological persuasions within traditionally 
Europhile contexts. At the same time, both countries have been affected to very 
different extents by the recent crises, allowing us to examine how populist parties 
have responded to different political opportunities. 
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Introduction 
Populist parties have made significant electoral inroads and are now integral part of European 
party systems. They pose not only a challenge to political elites at the national level, but also to 
the process of European integration. From a populist perspective, the EU can be interpreted as 
the ultimate elitist project, operating against the general will of the people, and according to 
non-democratic practices (e.g. Canovan, 1999). Populist organisations have been also 
considered ‘movements of crisis’, linking their emergence and fortunes to real or perceived 
crises (Taggart, 2000). As explained in the introduction of this Special Issue, the occurrence, in 
close sequence, of the ‘Great Recession’, the migrant crisis, and ‘Brexit’ gives us the opportunity 
to ascertain whether this holds in practice.  
By studying four Eurosceptic populist parties in Italy and the Netherlands this 
contribution seeks to advance the debate on this topic in a number of respects. First, by looking 
at the way populists framed Europe and its crises, we intend to ascertain if discourses 
effectively overlapped – and, if not, why. As crises are porous and fuzzy events, and primarily 
‘performed’ by populists (Moffitt, 2015), disentangling the mechanisms in place at these stages 
represents a meaningful way forward to understanding the relationship between populist 
parties and crises. Second, through the analysis of populist Eurosceptic frames in times of crisis, 
we set out to investigate whether the nature of oppositional discourses changed substantially 
over time in reaction to critical events. Finally, we devote some remarks to the reciprocal 
influence exerted by populist Eurosceptic actors at the end of our discussion. 
The article is structured as follows. First, we outline the rationale for our case selection, 
the main expectations, and the analytical strategy. Second, we look at the evolution of populist 
Eurosceptic discourses in the face of the multiple crises. Finally, we draw some comparative 
conclusions on the basis of our findings and briefly elaborate on the question of populist 
Eurosceptic impact across the two party systems. We find that all European crises provided 
ammunition for populist actors to emphasise their disenchantment with the process of 
European integration. While all of our cases started out as soft-Eurosceptic in the pre-crises 
years, some clearly hardened their Euroscepticism. However, the reactions of the populist 
parties and their framing of the various crises still varied, depending on their ideological 





Rationale and methodology 
From a comparative perspective, the two selected countries are interesting in that they a) 
demonstrate contextual differences in ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ Europe, and b) host electorally 
relevant populist parties of various kinds. While the first criterion should unravel differentiated 
populist responses across countries, the second should highlight how these responses were 
articulated among populist parties of different ideological persuasions. 
The Great Recession and the migrant crisis have affected both countries in different 
ways. While the Netherlands certainly felt the consequences of the economic crisis, its 
unemployment figures and government debt to GDP ratio remained roughly half the size of 
Italy’s, and the Italian economy experienced worse negative growth figures (Eurostat, 2016). 
Concerning the migrant crisis, Italy has been a key point of access for immigrants, whereas the 
Netherlands can be listed among countries of eventual destination (Economist, 2016). The 
cases thus allow us to examine how populist parties have reacted to different context-driven 
political opportunities. That is, populist parties’ responses can be expected to vary due to the 
different salience as well as effects of each crisis in both countries.  
The Italian and Dutch party systems both include populist parties that have opposed 
‘Europe’ through different ideological lenses. We can include the Italian Northern League (LN) 
and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) in the populist radical right party family, describe the 
Dutch Socialist Party (SP) as radical left, while the Italian 5 Star Movement (M5S) defies 
straightforward categorisations in terms of left and right: the M5S started out as an anti-
establishment party with left-libertarian concerns, but increasingly adopted nativist tones. This 
selection allows us to assess how populist parties of various kinds have reacted to the multiple 
European crises. It can, for instance, be expected that the ‘Great Recession’ was a salient theme 
for left-wing parties in particular, in view of their primary concern with socioeconomic issues, 
while populist radical right parties, generally more concerned with cultural issues, 
concentrated mainly on the migrant crisis. As Brexit has typically been associated with themes 
of sovereignty and democracy, it could arguably entice all types of populist parties.   
Although we anticipate a variety of specific responses due to these ideological and 
contextual differences, we generally expect socioeconomic arguments to have become 
dominant during the Great Recession, cultural arguments during the migrant crisis, and 
legitimacy and/or sovereignty arguments amid Brexit. On the whole, we interpret crises as a 
catalyst for particular frames, which may coexist with other traditional/pre-existing arguments 
against Europe. 
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Drawing on social movement theory, we resort to the notion of frames to explain the 
construction of collective identities and the creation of alternative systems of meaning at the 
public level (e.g. Snow et al., 1986). The use of frames fulfils a symbolic function, punctuating 
and connecting ‘patterns or happenings in the world’ (Snow and Benford, 1992: 138). We 
interpret them as the discursive stratagem to link populist Euroscepticism to the crises that 
unfolded during the past decade. In times of crisis, populist parties can use Eurosceptic frames 
as ‘interpretative schemata’ to single out an existing social condition or aspect of life, and define 
it as unjust and deserving of corrective action (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). Far from static, 
populist Eurosceptic frames are liable to continuous redefinition and adjustment. For this 
reason, we set to analyse the evolution of frames across time and, in fact, across crises. 
Acknowledging limitations in the categorisation of Eurosceptic frames in the extant 
literature (e.g. Helbling et al., 2010), we set to square the discourse of populist parties within 
four main frame categories. First, socioeconomic frames link Euroscepticism to economic and 
financial arguments, such as the mishandling of the sovereign debt crisis, and generally all those 
(negative) consequences attached to EU or Eurozone membership. Second, cultural frames link 
Euroscepticism to the issue of immigration and the security threats posed by (Muslim) ‘aliens’. 
Finally, sovereignty and legitimacy are typical oppositional frames deployed by populists. The 
former relates to the observation that European integration curtails the sovereignty of member 
states. Regarding the latter, populist Eurosceptics emphasise the democratic deficit 
underpinning the EU and question the legitimacy of decisions taken by supranational 
(unaccountable) elites (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Populist Eurosceptic frame categorisation 
Socioeconomic 
Economic and financial arguments, fiscal sovereignty, banks, bail-outs, 
national debt, Euro 
Cultural Immigration, multiculturalism, Christianity, Islam, security 
Sovereignty Delocalisation, transfer of decision-making, centralisation 
Legitimacy Democratic deficit, effectiveness, competence, corruption 
 
 
These frames are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, the free movement of labour 
is a topic that can be simultaneously framed in socioeconomic (threat to national workers’ 
position) and cultural (disturbance of social homogeneity) terms. Further, the legitimacy of the 
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EU may be directly related to supposed failures in economic or cultural policy areas (see 
Scharpf, 1999). We nevertheless deem the identified frames as useful heuristics to assess the 
EU-related discourse of populist parties. Within these categories, we set out to ascertain 
whether populist Eurosceptics effectively identified a problem and assigned blame for the 
unfolding of crises; and advanced solutions or particular courses of action. These are elements 
defined in social movement theory as ‘diagnostic’ and ‘prognostic’ framing, respectively (Snow 
and Benford, 1988). A third framing activity (‘motivational’), not directly relevant to our 
analysis of party discourses and positions, pertains to the rationale for action/inaction. 
We use qualitative content analysis of official party materials to reconstruct populist 
Eurosceptic frames. We start out from the frame categorisation presented in Table 1 and 
qualitatively assess the prominence of each frame amid each crisis. In order to respond to the 
(time-sensitive) challenge posed by the emergence of multiple crises, we combine evidence 
from different data sources. While prioritising the analysis of official programmatic documents 
for national and European Parliament (EP) elections, we resorted to additional sources in order 
to assess parties’ reactions to events occurring outside of election periods. In the case of Italy, 
we analysed news items appearing on the LN’s website between 2014 and 2016, and on Beppe 
Grillo’s blog (i.e. the M5S’s official website) between 2007 and 2016. In the case of the 
Netherlands, we similarly made use of news items posted on party websites, as well as party 
newsletters (period: 2014-2016). These sources also included summaries of MPs’ 
contributions to parliamentary debates.   
 
Who is what? Identifying the populist Eurosceptics 
Populism in Italy has been associated with the activities of mainstream as well as peripheral 
parties (e.g. Tarchi, 2015). Silvio Berlusconi’s political incarnations (i.e. Forza Italia, FI, 1994-
2009, and again since 2013; The People of Freedom, PdL, 2009-2013) are examples of alleged 
mainstream populism (e.g. Verbeek and Zaslove, 2016). Since neither FI nor PdL ever quite 
qualified as Eurosceptic organisations, however, they are irrelevant to our enquiry. 
The identification of the LN and the M5S as populist Eurosceptic actors is less 
contentious. The LN has, ever since its establishment in the early 1990s, centred its political 
activity on the defence of the ‘common (Northern) man’ against ‘Roma ladrona’ (the bad central 
elite). While the LN did not lose its regionalist appeal, the LN progressively shifted from ethno-
regionalism to nativism and authoritarianism by including xenophobia and ‘law and order’ in 
its discourse (Ignazi, 2005). It also intensified its opposition to Europe once the prospects for 
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the autonomy of Padania within the EU framework waned (Huysseune, 2010). The LN stressed 
the need to protect national customs and values from European integration, and criticised the 
adoption of the Euro, the unrestrained opening of markets, and the Eastern enlargement – 
elements that ostensibly played at the detriment of Padanian enterprises (LN, 2004).  
The M5S organised as a full-fledged party in 2009 and its rise can be partially linked to 
the multiple crises endured by the EU in recent years (e.g. della Porta et al., 2017). The fate and 
political outlook of the party and its leaders (Beppe Grillo and the late Gianroberto Casaleggio) 
are closely knit (e.g. Tronconi, 2015). Since 2005, Grillo has made consistent use of his blog as 
the primary channel to move anti-establishment attacks to the ‘caste’, often presenting himself 
as the ‘megaphone’ of the voiceless. Advocating an unmediated form of democracy, he claimed 
that the M5S ‘wants citizens to become State’, aspiring ‘common people with a clean record’ to 
enter the Parliament and overthrow those (i.e. the elites, the establishment) who ‘will never 
surrender’ (Grillo, 2011a). The manifesto released upon party formation (M5S 2009) – to this 
date, the only comprehensive programmatic document to be released – essentially presented 
the M5S as a post-materialist organisation concerned with ecology and direct democracy. Anti-
immigration stances, salient in the party discourse and in line with the nativist positions of the 
populist radical right, have been exclusively articulated outside official documents. Absent in 
the years prior to the crises, our analysis will show that the M5S gradually developed a 
pronounced Eurosceptic profile. 
Similar to the Italian cases, populist parties in the Netherlands are also characterised by 
ideological diversity (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012). The SP was founded in 1971, but entered 
the Dutch parliament only in 1994, after it departed from staunch communist doctrines and 
adopted a more populist discourse, which blamed the entire political establishment for 
subscribing to neoliberalism and the free-market ideology. The SP declared it wanted the 
people, not the market, to decide over the future (SP, 1998: 3). While the SP is still regularly 
identified as a populist party (e.g. Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013; Akkerman et al., 2014), it 
is evident that populism has become a more irregular element in the party’s discourse over the 
years (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012). The party nevertheless continued to perceive certain 
social ills through a populist lens. Its manifesto from 2010, for instance, argued that politicians 
had failed and that the interests of ‘the citizens’ played a decreasing role in politics (SP, 2010: 
5, 11); the version of 2017 similarly denounced the ‘politics of the elites’ (SP, 2017: 5). As far 
as European integration is concerned, the SP has described the EU as an undemocratic and 
neoliberal project that served the interests of large companies, while threatening working 
conditions and social rights (e.g. SP, 1998).  
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Geert Wilders’ PVV has established itself as the dominant populist radical right force in 
the Netherlands since its entry into parliament in 2006. Wilders blamed political elites for a raft 
of social problems, not least related to the spread of multiculturalism and ‘Islamisation’ of 
Dutch society (Vossen, 2011). Established politicians were, furthermore, accused of 
disregarding the concerns and interests of ordinary citizens. In addition, the PVV has, from its 
early days onwards, described the EU as an undemocratic ‘super state’, and lamented the 
handing over of sovereignty to Brussels bureaucrats (e.g. Wilders, 2005). The PVV also opposed 
financial transfers to the EU, the opening of borders to Eastern European labour migrants, and 
Turkish EU-membership.  
 
Eurosceptic frames in the face of the recent European crises 
Besides their populist profile, the parties included in this study displayed different shades of 
(soft) Euroscepticism prior to the unfolding of the various European crises; none proposed to 
end the EU membership of their country. We now set out to investigate how they responded to 
the crises identified above. 
 
The Great Recession 
In the wake of the Great Recession, the LN – then junior partner in the government coalition led 
by Berlusconi – did not specifically blame the EU for the unfolding of events; the economic and 
financial crisis was either labelled as ‘global’ or ‘international’. Responsible for multiple 
imbalances, ‘financial globalisation (promoted and carried out by the world of high finance)’ 
supposedly triggered a crisis of global scale (LN, 2009: 53). While the diagnostic framing was 
clearly defined along socioeconomic lines at the peak of the Great Recession, the crisis was also 
associated with a crisis of values, ideas, and ideals – i.e. ‘globalisation without values’ (LN, 2009: 
53-54). LN’s prognosis contemplated keeping enterprises alive, partly through protectionist 
measures to be introduced at the EU level (LN, 2009: 53-55). 
The LN’s soft-Eurosceptic frames continued to extend to the cultural, sovereignty, and 
legitimacy spheres. The party argued that European integration had created a ‘continental 
super-state, whose level of democracy is, in practice, non-existent’, and threatened ‘its peoples 
and European traditions’ (LN, 2009: 60-61). The LN aspired to a ‘confederal’ EU, in which 
member states could preserve their sovereignty and see cultural differences recognised. A 
cultural framing dominated the LN’s reading of non-procedural aspects related to Europe, 
referring in particular to the Christian roots of Europe (LN, 2009: 62-63). 
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The economic and financial crisis were not mentioned in the 2013 election manifesto – 
not even from an anti-globalist perspective. What is more, the party had virtually dropped its 
Eurosceptic discourse by reinstating the role of Italy within Europe; advancing proposals to 
overcome the politics of austerity by crafting a political, economic, and fiscal union (LN, 2013: 
3).  
However, the election of Matteo Salvini to new federal secretary (December 2013) 
marked a clear step towards the systematic delegitimisation of the EU. In the 2014 European 
manifesto, the legitimacy and sovereignty frames partly overlapped with each other. The 
document highlighted the EU’s democratic deficit, whereby the sovereign people of individual 
member states were considered to have lost out from the EU’s lack of accountability. The LN’s 
prognosis was to bring back the people at the centre of the European project by clarifying the 
roles of the EU and member states, ratifying treaties by means of referendums, and tying EU 
activities to national and European parliaments’ control (LN, 2014a: 3-5). In addition, the LN 
sought to regain complete national primacy regarding, among others, monetary and fiscal 
matters (LN, 2014a: 5-6). The cultural framing of Europe also emerged from the portrayal of 
the EU as a ‘globalist’ actor threatening local traditions and diversity (LN, 2014a: 30). 
The real turning point in the LN’s Eurosceptic trajectory is however the elaboration of a 
socioeconomic framing of Europe, which linked for the first time the economic and financial 
crisis to Italy’s Eurozone membership – and, though secondarily, to the mismanagements in the 
world of banking and finance. The LN’s key plan of action was captured by its slogan: ‘Out of 
the Euro. Now!’. 
 
The imposition of a single currency for the different economies of the EU member states 
has effectively deprived Europe of the principal instrument to face the dramatic effects of 
the economic crisis burst in the US in 2008. … Without monetary control, a state in 
recession cannot try to counter crises. Without monetary control, a state cannot have any 
autonomy and turns into a Third World country. … The Euro is today recognised by many 
European and international economists as a failed experiment. (LN, 2014a: 15) 
 
The LN sought to regain competitiveness by returning to ‘our’ currency and directly 
administering monetary policies at the national level (LN, 2014a: 15). In 2014, the party also 
issued a document titled Enough with the Euro. How to Exit the Nightmare, in which it directly 
linked the common currency to the crisis, articulating 31 ways to achieve ‘another Europe’ (LN, 
2014b). 
Beppe Grillo, the leader of the M5S, elaborated on political and financial crises of various 
sorts on his blog. The Global Financial Crisis appeared rather early in his critique, without 
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however taking Eurosceptic tones. Blame was instead directed at banks and their connivance 
with political powers (e.g. Grillo, 2009a, 2009b). Although Grillo had already noted how EU 
funds were allocated through shady procedures (Grillo, 2007), the role of Europe in the crisis 
did not dominate his discourse. The articulation of monetary arguments in relation to Eurozone 
membership and the Great Recession only started in 2011 (Grillo, 2011b). Grillo then gradually 
came to question the foundations of the EU, including the Euro, and oppose the idea of a 
Banking Union (Grillo, 2011c). 
By the end of 2011, the M5S held an internal referendum on withdrawal from the 
Eurozone (Grillo, 2011d). Grillo specified how it was possible to remain within the EU while 
reverting to national currencies – noting how the crisis had mostly affected Eurozone countries: 
‘It’s not about principled hostility to the Euro, but being able to afford it. In order to remain in 
the Eurozone, we are starving the country’ (Grillo, 2012). Grillo’s blog then either conducted or 
reported a series of interviews with prominent Eurosceptic figures (e.g. Grillo, 2013a, 2015b), 
which bridged the socioeconomic, legitimacy, and sovereignty framings of Euroscepticism. 
Successive campaigns adopted the slogan ‘out of the Euro’ and focused on defining the course 
of action for exit, while framing permanence within the Eurozone in terms of a ‘choice between 
life and death’ (Grillo, 2014a). 
Other than the two Italian cases, the Dutch SP did not radicalise its position on Europe 
much during the financial and economic crises. In its manifesto for the 2009 EP elections, the 
party listed its traditional grievances with European integration, using concomitantly 
socioeconomic, legitimacy, and sovereignty frames. The SP criticised other parties for 
supporting the current form of European integration, which had made Europe ‘one big market 
place’, where ‘economy trumps democracy time and time again’ (SP, 2009: 7). The party further 
referred to the Constitutional Treaty, which was rejected in 2005 by Dutch voters in a 
referendum. The Treaty had supposedly ‘threatened to turn the Netherlands into a powerless 
province in an undemocratic and a-social European super state (SP, 2009: 7) and the SP 
complained that voters were not given a second chance to vote on the new Lisbon Treaty.  
Thus, in the wake of the Great Recession, the SP’s soft-Eurosceptic discourse on Europe 
was marked above all by continuity. The crisis was not left unmentioned, however, and the SP 
partly blamed the EU, claiming that ‘Brussels has chosen the entirely wrong path of more 
market and ever less protection of the public good’ (SP, 2009: 43). In terms of prognostic 
framing, the SP suggested that the freedom of bankers, investors and large companies had to 
be limited, for instance by means of stricter regulation of the global financial markets.  
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The 2010 national election manifesto devoted relatively little attention to the EU. The 
party argued that the crisis of ‘casino capitalism’ implied a ‘painful unmasking of the political 
and economic elites’, but blamed the crisis on bankers, shareholders, and managers rather than 
on the EU (SP, 2010: 5). In its manifesto for the early 2012 election, the SP’s diagnosis was 
similar; the party criticised the fiscal rules and austerity measures imposed by Brussels, but did 
not hold the EU responsible for the crisis as such (SP, 2012: 65). The 2014 EP election manifesto 
struck a different tone: the banking crisis was deemed ‘the direct consequence of the neoliberal 
policy characterising the EU since the 1990s’ (SP, 2014: 5).  
Despite some inconsistencies concerning blame attribution, the SP clearly continued to 
address the malign economic consequences of European integration. The lack of democratic 
legitimacy and loss of sovereignty also remained recurring themes. Indeed, in 2014 the party 
argued that ‘[t]he current crisis is abused to accelerate the process towards a European 
federation’ (SP, 2014: 9). At the same time, however, the party called for a greater coordination 
between the economic policies of EU and Eurozone members as a means to counter the crisis 
(SP, 2012: 65); a greater role for the European Central Bank (ECB) in stimulating employment; 
and a European-wide regulation of financial markets (SP, 2012: 60). These proposals, along 
with pleas for closer cooperation concerning cross-border problems and protection of labour 
rights, appeared somewhat at odds with the SP’s more general denunciation of ‘Brussels’ 
interference’.  
The radical right PVV has been less ambiguous about its position on Europe. The party 
acknowledged the value of economic and trade cooperation, but has been wary of other forms 
of integration. The use of multiple frames remained a consistent feature of the party’s EU 
discourse, although the party made a more explicit link between European integration, 
immigration, and multiculturalism from 2010 onwards. The EU was dubbed a ‘multicultural 
super state’, and the party complained that ‘thanks to that club in Brussels, Europe is swiftly 
turning into Eurabia’ (PVV, 2010: 13).  
The main discontinuities in the PVV discourse relate to the tone and intensity of its 
opposition to Europe over time (e.g. Van Kessel and Castelein, 2016). Much more so than 
before, the issue took centre stage in the programme of 2012, which was titled ‘Their Brussels, 
our Netherlands’. It was also at this time that Wilders explicitly began to criticise the EU’s 
handling of the financial and economic crisis. Indeed, Wilders’ central argument for previously 
withdrawing support from the incumbent minority government, and triggering the 2012 
election, centred on opposition to the austerity measures proposed to comply with Brussels’ 
budget rules. The 2012 manifesto contained a multitude of disparaging comments about 
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partying ‘EU-nationalists’ enjoying ‘ever-lasting lunches’, ‘blind inhabitants of the ivory towers 
in Brussels’, and Dutch politicians slavishly following the orders of their European ‘masters’ 
(PVV, 2012: 11).  
The PVV’s criticism of the EU remained multifaceted, although the manifesto included 
various references to the crisis, in particular related to the financial transactions to member 
states in Eastern and Southern Europe. Overall, the Great Recession ostensibly encouraged 
Wilders to increase the salience of European integration, and to make Euroscepticism a central 
theme of his party’s campaign. The party’s prognostic framing also changed in 2012; for the 
first time, the PVV proposed to end Dutch membership of the EU and the Eurozone, thus moving 
from soft to hard Euroscepticism. The party maintained its hard-Eurosceptic course prior the 
EP elections of 2014 and national election of 2017 (PVV, 2014; 2017a), although Wilders’ focus 
had largely shifted away from the EU in the latter campaign. Notably, apart from a reference to 
Europe’s open borders, clear-cut Euroscepticism was also lacking in Wilders’ official response 
to the coalition agreement reached between four rival parties in October 2017 (PVV, 2017b).   
Across our four cases, the Great Recession certainly had a considerable impact. 
Irrespective of domestic context and ideology, all populist parties highlighted structural flaws 
in the EU in their analysis of the Eurozone crisis and economic downturn. The SP’s discourse 
was the steadiest in this regard: socioeconomic issues had always been the party’s main 
concern. The intensity of the other parties’ criticism of the EU fluctuated – ostensibly depending 
on party leadership strategies – and remained more multifaceted. It is also notable that 
socioeconomic arguments gained strength with some delay after the outbreak of the Eurozone 
crisis. 
 
The migrant crisis 
As far as the migrant crisis is concerned, Italy has been exposed to grand-scale migratory flows 
already before 2015. This partly explains why the LN already denounced a ‘boom’ of arrivals to 
Italian shores in 2013, and framed immigration as a problem for national security. At first, the 
LN asserted the need for tighter cooperation between European police forces and border patrol 
units – though independently from Brussels (LN, 2014a: 29). Somewhat inconsistently, the LN 
later blamed the EU for the poor involvement and effectiveness in the management of non-EU 
immigration, proposing to counter illegal immigration ‘at the source’, and claiming that the 
entire onus should rest on the EU (LN, 2015a: 11). The LN further demanded substantial 
revisions to the Dublin III Regulation, which determines asylum applications to be processed 
in the EU country of entry (LN, 2015a: 14). 
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The issue of immigration and security only gained new impetus with the advancement 
of Islamic State and in the wake of the Paris attacks of January 2015, virtually linking the 
populist Euroscepticism of the LN to legitimacy and cultural frames. The crisis mainly served 
to bridge the issue of security – now escalated from criminality to terrorism – with immigration. 
The party denounced the mismanagement of uncontrolled immigration: ‘The EU should 
abandon the carelessness of its political activity, and return to stress and defend its roots’ (LN, 
2015b).  
Yet, the blaming of the EU during the migrant crisis has been at best marginal. News 
items issued between 2014 and 2016 only sporadically referred to the EU. The European 
Commission’s proposal to distribute migrants more evenly across member states was, 
nevertheless, interpreted as another disaster crafted by the EU (LN, 2015d). The LN endorsed 
the Hungarian government’s decision to close down borders and build a fence in Summer 2015, 
which was congruent with its aspiration to defend nation states against the diktats of EU 
bureaucrats, and to prevent ‘the death of the European culture’ (LN, 2015e). 
As in the case of the LN, the question of illegal immigration appeared in the M5S’s 
discourse before the crisis took a pan-European breadth (e.g. Grillo, 2013b); the party often 
dubbed Italy the ‘refugee camp of Europe’. The bulk of the party’s criticism targeted the Dublin 
Regulation signed by Berlusconi and the LN – a leitmotiv throughout the migrant crisis. The 
M5S proposed to relocate humanitarian aid towards the countries of departure, and lift the 
burden imposed on countries of first arrival (Grillo, 2014b). The party further criticised EU 
institutions for their decisional stalemate (Grillo, 2015c), and denounced the selfishness of 
member states that arbitrarily decided to suspend the Schengen Agreement (Grillo, 2015d). In 
reaction to the EU’s laxness, the M5S proposed to limit the issuing of residence permits on 
humanitarian grounds, introduce a system of forced repatriation, and increase the surveillance 
of asylum seekers (Grillo, 2015e). More recently, it also criticised the EU for the agreement on 
migrants sealed with the Turkish government (Grillo, 2016a). 
While the Dutch SP mainly criticised the EU on socioeconomic grounds, the party has 
nevertheless been sceptical of labour migration, which was deemed to exploit immigrants from 
Central and Eastern Europe, boost unfair competition for workers at home, and degrade social 
entitlements and labour conditions (e.g. SP, 2006: 58). As regards asylum seekers, the SP has 
generally taken a more welcoming stance; the SP also spoke out in favour of European 
agreements leading to a fair distribution of refugees in case of calamities (SP, 2014: 23). In 
November 2013, SP MEP Dennis de Jong urged the EU to actively cooperate to offer refugees 
temporary protection (De Jong, 2013). In October 2015, the party declared its support for 
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granting refugees shelter in the Netherlands, but at the same time stressed the need to take 
seriously the concerns of the local population (SP, 2015). The party also argued that the real 
solution for the migrant crisis was to be found not in the Netherlands, but in the region of 
conflict.    
The PVV presented a different analysis of the situation. The party had always opposed 
‘mass-immigration’, and in more recent years proposed a ‘complete end to immigration from 
Islamic countries’ (PVV, 2010: 15). As the migrant crisis unfolded, the PVV started the campaign 
‘Borders Closed!’ and declared: 
 
The asylum-tsunami from Islamic countries threatens the Netherlands. Everything is at 
stake: our security, freedom and future. These migrants are not concerned with safety. 
They were safe already in the countries they passed through. The sheltering of one 
asylum seeker costs us 36,000 euro per year. Billions of euros are at stake. Money that 
we can’t spend for the benefit of the Dutch anymore. (PVV, 2015a)   
 
The PVV thus framed the migrant crisis in cultural as well as economic terms. In one 
parliamentary debate, Wilders questioned the legitimacy of welcoming migrants, by reading 
out letters of citizens complaining about the asocial, obscene, and unlawful behaviour of (male) 
asylum seekers (PVV, 2015b). Particularly the safety of women was a concern for Wilders, who 
proposed the ‘Islamic testosterone bombs’ to be locked up in the asylum seeker centres (PVV, 
2016a). Although the PVV leader did not primarily focus on the EU’s actions in his diagnosis of 
the problem, he did hold European leaders responsible, blaming them for forsaking ‘our women 
and daughters’ by refusing to close their national borders. As far as issue-solving was 
concerned, the PVV rebuffed the need for a European plan or a deal with Turkey; the party’s 
solution was simply to close Dutch borders (PVV, 2016b). 
The migrant crisis, all in all, had quite a different impact on the discourse of each of our 
four cases. Ostensibly due to the timing of the migrant crisis in Italy, and the increasing 
convergence of the LN and the M5S on nativist grounds, the populist Eurosceptic frames of 
these parties bore a number of similarities, and related primarily to culture and legitimacy. The 
EU was both blamed for inaction and taking wrong measures, placing disproportional pressure 
on Italy. The Dutch SP showed a more welcoming stance towards asylum seekers and could not 
genuinely be deemed Eurosceptic when it came down to this issue. The PVV, on the other hand, 
showed no solidarity with (Islamic) migrants at all. The party lamented the EU’s open borders 




In reaction to the Brexit vote, the LN claimed to have always stood up for the European people’s 
ability to choose between death by European rules or rebirth through sovereignty: ‘The strong 
powers have lost, the sovereign people have chosen and defeated them’ (LN, 2016a). The Brexit 
referendum was used as a lens to filter internal affairs and undermine the Italian referendum 
on constitutional reform proposed by PM Renzi that took place in December 2016. Campaigning 
on the ‘no’ side, the LN drew parallels between opposition to Renzi’s proposed reforms and the 
British call for democracy through the UK referendum (LN, 2016a). The LN accordingly tried to 
turn the result of the UK referendum against the pro-European government – and, thus, use it 
for internal purposes. While the Brexit referendum was deemed a great display of freedom, ‘the 
real question now is whether democracy is compatible with Europe. We have been the only 
ones to vote against the Fiscal Compact and support the Europe of peoples’ (LN, 2016b). Hence, 
amid sovereignty and legitimacy frames, Brexit has been also defined in socioeconomic terms. 
In particular, the British people were seen to have chosen freedom without subduing to the 
world of financial lobbies, on the one hand, and the Europe of banks and multinationals, on the 
other (LN, 2016c). 
The M5S anticipated the Brexit referendum bearing deflagrating consequences for the 
institutional setup of the EU – regardless of its eventual outcome. Amid pre-referendum 
negotiations, the M5S feared a further anti-democratic and German-centric turn for Eurozone 
members, which would deprive them of the last remnants of sovereignty left. In light of these 
prospects, the M5S called for an emergency plan to dismantle the Eurozone (Grillo, 2016b). 
Above all, the Brexit referendum was perceived as a direct indication of the critical situation 
faced by several member states and the downright failure of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ governance 
model of the EU (Grillo, 2016c). In the wake of the UK referendum, the M5S interpreted the 
result as a ‘victory for direct democracy’ (Grillo, 2016d); a way to sanction the failure of the 
politics of austerity, which prioritised the interests of banks and finance over those of its 
peoples, and the selfishness of other member states during the migrant crisis (Grillo, 2016e). 
Grillo’s party’s prognostic framing of Brexit was not entirely consistent, however: while the 
M5S originally advocated the opportunity to renegotiate EU membership and exit from the 
Eurozone (Grillo, 2016c), it successively backtracked on these demands (Grillo, 2016f).  
In his reaction to the referendum outcome, SP leader Emile Roemer argued that ‘the out-
vote of the British proves that the European project cannot survive without support of the 
population. If the EU does not learn from Brexit, and the undemocratic European integration 
continues, this will definitely initiate a domino-effect’ (SP, 2016). According to the SP, Brexit 
 14 
provided an opportunity to make Europe less neo-liberal and more democratic; ‘away from the 
Europe of mutual competition and [towards] building a slimmed-down EU. A New Union, of 
cooperation between countries, instead of a Union with diktats from Brussels’ (SP, 2016). The 
frames the SP used in reaction to Brexit thus related to sovereignty and legitimacy, as well as 
socioeconomic questions. Yet in its manifesto for the 2017 parliamentary election, Brexit was 
not mentioned a single time, although the SP did propose to hold a referendum on a revised EU 
Treaty (SP, 2017: 53). 
The PVV showed more enthusiasm for Brexit and congratulated the British with 
‘Independence Day’. The party wrote in its newsletter: ‘Great Britain shows Europe the way 
towards the future and liberation. It is now time for a new start, depending on one’s own 
strength and sovereignty. Also in the Netherlands’ (PVV, 2016c). According to the PVV, the 
Dutch deserved their own referendum as soon as possible. In the parliamentary debate on 
Brexit, Wilders spoke of a momentous event: ‘the UK chose for Brexit, for national sovereignty, 
for independence and against the almighty Brussels, the EU-super state and all those Europhile 
politicians’ (PVV, 2016d). According to Wilders, the referendum result showed that citizens no 
longer tolerated the arrogance of the elites, who had ignored the ordinary men and women. For 
the PVV, then, Brexit highlighted the illegitimate character of the EU and the unresponsiveness 
of political elites, and the party repeated its desire to return sovereignty back where it 
belonged: the nation-state. Similar to the SP, however, Brexit hardly featured in the PVV’s 
campaign for the 2017 parliamentary election. 
 
Table 2. Populist Eurosceptic frames in the face of the multiple crises 
Parties 
Frames 










































The PVV thus mainly used sovereignty and legitimacy frames, whereas the framing of the Italian 
parties and the SP extended also to the socioeconomic sphere. The discursive evolution among 
Italian populist parties may be partly attributed to the structural fiscal and economic problems 
experienced by their country. Consequently, the EU and the compliant pro-European elites 
were still blamed for the Great Recession at the time of the Brexit referendum. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
As typical opponents of European integration, and actors feeding on real or perceived crises, 
populist parties could take advantage of the multiple crises hitting the EU. The Great Recession, 
migrant crisis, and Brexit arguably lent credence to their dismissal of the EU as a malfunctioning 
apparatus lacking public support and democratic legitimacy. Populist parties could be expected 
to mould their anti-EU discourse in response to the events as they unfolded. At the same time, 
populist parties’ responses were unlikely to be uniform, not least in view of their varying 
ideological profiles, as well as dissimilarities in the way the crises affected their specific 
national contexts. 
As far as the relationship between Euroscepticism and crises is concerned, our enquiry 
revealed that populist parties do not necessarily reconcile the two in a consequential manner. 
Populist Eurosceptic actors do not promptly, nor automatically, blame ‘Europe’ amid crises 
with a marked European trait. Three of the four parties we studied remained essentially soft 
Eurosceptic (SP) or did not explicitly cross the hard-Eurosceptic ladder (LN and M5S); only the 
Dutch PVV started calling for a Dutch withdrawal from the EU from 2012 onwards. Crises are 
then primarily constructs performed by populist Eurosceptic actors. This was evident during 
the Great Recession, which in three of our cases only slowly translated into the expected 
socioeconomic framing of Euroscepticism.  
 On the other hand, while the construction and prioritisation of frames is dependent on 
strategic choices and contextual idiosyncrasies, populist Euroscepticism certainly proved a 
common denominator across cases and crises. This may demonstrate that the easiest way to 
undermine the credibility of the European project, from a populist perspective, is to sustain a 
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systematic criticism of its undemocratic character and inability to weather different crises. As 
we have already mentioned, the legitimacy frame serves as a powerful stratagem to articulate 
populist anti-establishment views at the transnational level. 
There were also certain predictable patterns in populist party reactions, with 
socioeconomic frames (eventually) featuring in their discourse after the economic downturn, 
and legitimacy and sovereignty frames central to their reactions to Brexit. Concerning the latest 
crisis, all populist parties used the opportunity to argue that the voice of the people trumped 
the unresponsive decisions of the national and European elites. We furthermore saw that they 
used Brexit to reiterate their discontent with the handling of the preceding crises. The LN traced 
the causes of Brexit in the centralising attempts of Brussels and European lobbies; the M5S 
interpreted the outcome as a direct result of EU mismanagements of the economic and migrant 
crises; the PVV and SP argued that Brexit was borne out of the elites’ more general disregard of 
the will of the people. What is clear, however, is that Brexit did not constitute a very prominent 
theme for long in the discourses of the Italian and Dutch populist parties. If anything, the 
uncertain outcome of Brexit talks and lack of appetite for withdrawal outside the UK, have 
probably led parties of the populist camp to reconsider the hardest portions of their 
Eurosceptic agendas.       
At the risk of oversimplifying an otherwise composite picture, we can argue that long-
standing distinctions between radical-right and radical-left populist Euroscepticism were 
largely preserved (see Hooghe et al., 2002; De Vries and Edwards, 2009). All populist parties 
used legitimacy and sovereignty frames, yet cultural frames were mostly used by the radical 
right (LN and PVV), whereas the left-wing SP stuck to a socioeconomic framing criticising the 
neoliberal character of European integration – while notably welcoming a European solution 
to the migrant crisis. An ideologically hybrid organisation such as the M5S virtually sat 
somewhere in between: while the dominant framing during the Great Recession remained 
socioeconomic, it took nativist cultural tones amid the migrant crisis.  
The relationship between ideology and framing should however not be overstated. 
Socioeconomic frames were used also by the radical right PVV and LN, although their more 
specific arguments varied, presumably due to the different impact of the economic crisis in their 
respective countries. The LN – similar to the M5S – focused in particular on the Euro, which was 
seen as the cause of much of the hardship endured by the Italian population. The PVV similarly 
lamented the negative consequences of the crisis for Dutch citizens, but also directed much of 
its criticism towards the transfers by the Dutch government to the EU and financially unstable 
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countries – supposedly responding to public dissatisfaction with the country’s ‘creditor’ role 
during the crisis. 
At the same time, the issue of immigration was not the exclusive prerogative of right-
wing populists. The left-wing SP opposed free movement of labour if this meant unfair 
competition and exploitation of workers. The party, however, framed the issue more in a 
socioeconomic than cultural sense. The SP’s analysis of the ‘Great Recession’ also lacked the 
explicit ‘welfare chauvinist’ narrative that characterised the PVV – i.e. that money spent abroad 
should instead be saved for Dutch citizens. 
Future research should focus on the impact of populist Euroscepticism. In our cases no 
true deviation from the pro-EU route seems to have taken place among mainstream actors, with 
the only exception being Berlusconi’s FI in Italy (McDonnell, 2014). FI’s Eurosceptic move may 
well have been a reaction to the growing popularity of Salvini within the Italian right bloc. While 
political alliances with populist Eurosceptics are very much in flux ahead of the 2018 elections, 
Berlusconi’s FI seems again set on a Europhile route within the boundaries of the European 
People’s Party (Corriere della Sera, 2017).  
While the Dutch Liberals (VVD) and Christian Democrats (CDA) have voiced Eurosceptic 
arguments in recent years, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which the parties were inspired 
by their electoral competitor, the PVV. In any case, all Dutch mainstream parties remain far 
removed from Wilders’ hard-Eurosceptic position. Since Wilders lately turned down the 
volume on Europe, and the SP’s Euroscepticism remains relatively soft, there have also been 
few incentives for mainstream parties to radically alter their positions, or to translate their 
Eurosceptic rhetoric into concrete actions while in government. The coalition agreement signed 
in October 2017 between VVD, CDA, and two other parties, contained few traces of 
Euroscepticism.  
Perhaps more suggestive is the interchange between populist Eurosceptics. At least the 
Italian case presents us with a scenario in which the LN and M5S were subject to mutual 
influence: Grillo’s party was the first to elaborate on exit from the Eurozone – a theme taken up 
by the LN only under Salvini’s leadership – and the presence of the populist Eurosceptic 
counterpart in the discourse of each party clearly substantiates a competition on the basis of 
common frames. On the Dutch radical right, meanwhile, Wilders is currently joined by a 
populist Eurosceptic newcomer, Forum for Democracy (FvD), which has broken the PVV’s 
monopoly on hard Euroscepticism.     
The analysis of populist Eurosceptic trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands answered 
a number of questions on the responsiveness of these actors as well as their frame construction 
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and bridging mechanisms. The relationship between populism, Euroscepticism, and crises is 
however far from straightforward and constantly exposed to empirical and conceptual 
challenges. It is only by pinpointing these aspects in a systematic way that a thorough 
understanding of these organisations can be ultimately attained. 
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